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Writing devoted to explaining the development of central banking in Australia has often 
attached special significance to contemporary events and problems. L.F. Giblin, for 
example, who was both a practitioner and historian of central banking, asserted that ‘The 
story of the development of central banking in Australia must be set against the 
contemporary political and economic background.’ (Giblin 1951: vii) H.C. Coombs, the 
first Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the last Governor of the 
Commonwealth Bank, argued that ‘a central bank cannot be created merely by legislative 
fiat. It must grow like a living organism within the environment provided by the financial 
and economic system in which it exists; its practices and structure must evolve in 
response to the needs and demands of that system.’ (Giblin 1951: v) A recent Governor 
of the RBA, Ian Macfarlane, has endorsed this view: ‘Looking back at the evolution of 
monetary and financial affairs over the past century’, he said in his 2006 Boyer Lectures, 
‘shows that all policy frameworks have had to be adjusted when they failed to cope with 
the emergence of a major problem…The lightly regulated framework in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century was discredited by the Depression and replaced by a 
heavily regulated one accompanied by discretionary fiscal and monetary policy. This in 
turn was discredited by the great inflation of the 1970s and was replaced by another 
lightly regulated one’. (Macfarlane 2006:114) 
 
Macfarlane dismissed the view that ideas or ideology had played a dominant role in the 
transformation of central banking in Australia. About the origins of the reforms to 
monetary policy and the operation of the RBA over the past quarter of a century, 
Macfarlane concluded that: 
 
It is sometimes claimed by opponents of these reforms that they were 
implemented because policy-makers were enraptured by the idea of the free 
market and so embraced the concept of laissez-faire. This may be true for a 
few, but for most I think the process was much more prosaic than this, at 
least in the macroeconomic sphere. I think politicians and economic 
bureaucrats came to realize that the process of setting key financial prices, 
such as interest rates on government bonds, lending rates by banks or the 
exchange rate, was not working. It was just too difficult to do it properly, 
and if you got it wrong, as you inevitably would, the consequences could be 
painful – for example, trying to defend an over-valued fixed exchange rate. 
(Macfarlane 2002: 45) 
 
This paper highlights the development of central banking in Australia from 1920 to 1970. 
It emphasizes the importance of historical circumstances as determinants of the progress 
of central banking and the pivotal contributions of six men: Sir John Garvan (member of 
the Australian Notes Board and first chairman of the board of the Commonwealth Bank); 
E.G. Theodore (Treasurer of Australia); Sir Robert Gibson (the second chairman of the 
Commonwealth Bank board); Sir Leslie Melville (the Commonwealth Bank’s first 
Economist); J.B. Chifley (Treasurer and Prime Minister of Australia); and H.C. Coombs.   2
The paper argues that their responses to contemporary issues and problems led to 
fundamental changes in the nature and governance of central banking in Australia. 
 
Though the idea that a national bank should be created in the Australian colonies was 
canvassed on several occasions from the mid-nineteenth century, interest was heightened 
in the 1890s as a result of the severe financial and banking collapse in the early years of 
that decade. The Australian Labor Party (ALP), formed in the same decade, and owing its 
origins to the economic and industrial turmoil experienced at the turn of the 1890s, took 
up the idea that a people’s bank should be formed to provide the Australian public with a 
more secure and less expensive supply of financial services than those provided by 
privately-owned banks. Also floated in Labor circles was the need for a central bank to 
avoid another banking collapse. At national conferences during the first decade after 
Federation, the ALP debated the possibility of creating a government-owned institution 
that would combine the functions of commercial and central banking. In 1908 the party 
wrote into its fighting platform a pledge to establish ‘A Commonwealth Bank’, which 
would serve as a bank of issue, deposit, exchange and reserve; in short, a composite 
commercial and central bank that would accept deposits from the public, would be 
responsible for the national note issue, the reserves of the banking system, the payment 
system and would re-discount acceptable bank securities.  
 
In 1911 the labor government of Andrew Fisher introduced legislation to establish a 
national bank, to be called the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, a government-owned 
trading bank with a savings bank component. Contrary to the expectation that such a bank 
would be given central banking responsibilities, Fisher made it clear that the 
Commonwealth Bank would simply be a commercial bank, having the ‘power to carry on 
the general business of banking’. ‘Time and experience’, he added, ‘will show how its 
functions for usefulness may be extended.’ (Fisher 1911: 2944, 2646) Here, Fisher was 
alluding perhaps to the possibility that the Commonwealth Bank might evolve into a 
central bank once it had established itself as a successful business enterprise. However, 
when he was asked whether it was intended that the Bank would have its headquarters in 
the proposed seat of government, Fisher replied that he was ‘not of that opinion. This is a 
business concern pure and simple.’ As it was, the Commonwealth Bank’s only central 
banking function at the time of its creation was that of banker to the Commonwealth 
government, with an expectation that state governments would transfer their banking 
business to the Commonwealth Bank. It was not given responsibility for the note issue; 
that task had been assigned to the Commonwealth Treasury by the Notes Act of 1910.  
 
Thereafter the Bank gradually acquired central banking functions. The First World War 
saw it heavily involved in managing the Commonwealth government’s debt when the 
government began to borrow locally and overseas for the first time. It was also associated 
with various marketing arrangements undertaken by the government to overcome 
difficulties arising from the disruption to international trade in the country’s traditional 
export products. Even though it had engaged in these national activities during the war, 
by the end of the war the Bank remained primarily a savings and trading bank. 
 
Garvan and the Return to Gold   3
 
The first legislative attempt to create a central bank in Australia took place in 1924 when 
the government amended the Commonwealth Bank Act with the express purpose of 
establishing a central bank. This decision was the result of a series of historical events 
that culminated in the formulation of a monetary policy aimed at returning Australia to 
the gold standard. When the Commonwealth Bank was established in 1911, Australia 
adhered to the gold standard. This had been the case since the late 1850s. Before then, the 
rate of exchange between Australian currency and international currency (sterling in 
particular) had fluctuated, there being no fixed standard of exchange. But as a result of 
the gold discoveries in the 1850s and the accumulation of sizeable gold and sterling 
assets in London, the Australian banks were able to maintain a fixed rate of exchange at 
parity (₤A100=₤stg100) between Australian currency and sterling. From the second half 
of the nineteenth century to the early years of the twentieth century the exchange rate 
rarely departed from parity with sterling. Even during the depression of the 1890s, 
exchange with sterling remained within the gold points. External balance was maintained 
at that time by depressed activity and mass unemployment. 
 
During the First World War the promise to redeem gold for Australian notes at the 
conventional fixed rate was suspended and an embargo placed upon the export of gold 
from Australia. Here, Australia was following Britain and other countries associated with 
the British Empire. Federal government spending on war and war-related activities 
expanded considerably and various devices were used to fund the expenditure. These 
financial arrangements added to inflationary pressures, made worse by a chronic shortage 
of resources, labour in particular. As a result, Australian prices rose at record rates, 
though not as fast as price inflation in the United Kingdom, but faster than in the United 
States. (Cornish 1988) 
 
At the end of the war the British monetary authorities signaled their intention to return to 
the gold standard at the prewar parity with gold (and with the United States dollar, which 
had not departed from gold). Since British prices had increased more rapidly than 
American prices, Britain’s return to the gold standard had to wait until the US-UK price 
level was restored roughly to the relationship that had prevailed between the two 
currencies before the war. Either prices in the United States would have to increase, or 
British prices would have to fall, or some combination of these outcomes would have to 
take place if monetary stability was to prevail in Britain. Since there could be no certainty 
that prices in the United States would rise, the authorities concluded that monetary 
tightening would have to be adopted in Britain so as to deflate prices there, or at the least 
to moderate any tendency for prices to rise. In Australia, some authorities began to 
demand restraint in government expenditure and slower monetary growth. A 
Commonwealth Royal Commission at the end of the war, chaired by Sir Robert Gibson, 
urged the federal government to reduce its spending with the intention of curbing 
inflation. 
 
In these circumstances, the spotlight began to focus on government policy regarding the 
issuing of currency. The Governor of the Commonwealth Bank, Sir Denison Miller, had 
argued for some time that responsibility for the note issue should be transferred from the   4
Commonwealth Treasury to the Commonwealth Bank. This was because there was more 
expertise on monetary questions in the Bank than in the Treasury, and because the Bank 
had branches throughout the Commonwealth, whereas the Treasury had a single office – 
then in Melbourne. There can be little doubt that Miller also believed that control of the 
note issue was something for which a central bank should have responsibility, not a 
government department, which could too easily succumb to political pressure. Miller 
made several representations to the government along these lines, and actually drafted 
legislation providing for the transfer of the note issue from the Treasury to the Bank. The 
question of the excessive war-time supply of notes was now raised in the context of 
postwar monetary policy and the need for greater circumspection in the funding of 
government expenditure from an inflated supply of currency. This concern about the note 
issue, according to Miller, was a fundamental reason why the note-issuing authority 
should be transferred from the government-controlled Treasury to the more independent 
Commonwealth Bank. 
 
When it created the Australian Notes Board (the ANB) in 1920, the government acceded 
in part to Miller’s request to have responsibility for the note issue transferred to the Bank. 
The administration of the note issue was to be undertaken in a separate department of the 
Commonwealth Bank, but the ANB itself was to have its own board of four directors 
with the Bank’s Governor as chairman ex officio. Once established, the ANB proceeded 
to adopt a policy, promoted in particular by one of its members, John. J. Garvan, a 
Sydney businessman, to contract the note issue, the aim being to reduce domestic price 
levels. The ultimate objective was to raise the existing devalued rate of exchange between 
the Australian pound and gold, thereby returning Australia to the gold standard at the 
prewar parity with gold. In the result, the ANB was highly successful in achieving its 
aim. By 1924 sterling had fallen to less than ₤A97 = ₤stg100 in the bank-dominated 
‘official’ exchange market; in outside markets, dominated by non-banking institutions, 
the value of sterling against the Australian pound fell considerably further than it did in 
the ‘official’ market. 
 
The technique adopted by the ANB was to refuse to exchange currency notes in Australia 
for gold and sterling accumulated in London by Australian banks from export proceeds 
and loan receipts. In this way it was expected that the money supply in Australia would 
decline. Refusing to exchange Australian notes for sterling in London was admittedly a 
crude procedure and the banks for a time were able to circumvent the ANB’s intention by 
running down their domestic reserves of currency. But there were plainly limits to which 
the banks’ cash reserves could fall. Having reached the minimum level, the banks were 
then forced to reduce their lending; activity contracted, prices eased and the exchange 
rate rose.  
 
 The ANB believed a reduction in the money supply arising from restrictions on the 
issuing of currency would lower domestic prices which, in turn, would raise the 
Australian exchange rate. Monetary contraction occurred as a result of refusing to 
exchange notes in Australia for assets in London. Particularly affected was the farm 
sector, whose export receipts were accumulating in London. Tightness in money markets 
in Australia meant there was difficulty transferring income from London to Australia.   5
Some relief arrived when gold was transferred from New York to Australia (there was an 
embargo on the export of gold from London), but the expansionary impact of the inflow 
of gold was nullified to some extent as a result of sterilization measures adopted by the 
monetary authorities. By deliberately selling government securities to mop up the 
monetary expansion arising from imported gold, the first open market operations in 
Australia’s monetary history were performed. 
 
This was the background to the amendments to the Commonwealth Bank Act passed in 
1924. Earle Page, the Treasurer and Leader of the Country Party, aimed to end the 
monetary contraction, which was hurting his rural constituents, by abolishing the ANB 
and providing the Bank with responsibility for the note issue. A board of directors was 
created for the Commonwealth Bank, with members appointed from various sectors of 
Australian industry, including farm industries. The expectation was that such a board 
would be more accommodating than the ANB had been to the plight of exporters and 
farm communities. The government’s intentions were soon dashed, however, when it 
appointed Garvan, the chief architect of the ANB’s policy, to the new Board; the board 
itself then promptly elected Garvan to be its chairman. Therefore, very little changed, 
with Garvan reaffirming his belief that Australia should return to the gold standard as 
soon as possible, and insisting that a tight domestic monetary policy – based on limiting 
the issue of currency notes – should continue to be pursued in order to exert downward 
pressure upon local price levels.  
 
By the early months of 1925 the Australian pound had reached the pre-war parity with 
gold and the United States dollar; as a result, Australia was ready to announce its return 
to the gold standard. Within the British Empire, South Africa had already returned to 
gold, as had some European countries. However the British government, acting upon 
advice from the Bank of England, persuaded Prime Minister Bruce to wait until Britain 
had made its decision to return to gold which, Australia was assured, would happen in the 
not too distant future. In his Budget speech on 28 April 1925, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Winston Churchill, announced that Britain would immediately return to gold 
at the prewar parity. As a result of Britain’s decision, Australia also returned to the gold 
standard. In his budget speech to the House of Commons, Churchill explained that the 
imminent return to the gold standard by some Empire countries, including Australia, was 
a major factor behind Britain’s decision to return to gold. 
 
The policy of monetary contraction, prosecuted at first by the ANB, and then by the 
board of the Commonwealth Bank, was the first conscious attempt at central banking in 
Australia. Open market operations were used for the first time, and the amendments to 
the Commonwealth Bank Act in 1924, motivated by concerns about the policy approach 
of the ANB, constituted the first explicit attempt to convert the Commonwealth Bank to a 
central bank. Page stated as much when he supported the amendments in his second 
reading speech to the parliament. Referring to the exchange rate problems that had 
plagued Australia since the end of the war, he remarked: ‘In troubles such as these, one 
would naturally look to banking authorities to find a way out or at least to advise as to the 
remedies to be applied. But in fact there is no banking body which can be considered 
representative. Instead, we have a number of banks which, though loosely associated for   6
some purposes, scarcely can express a corporate opinion. Chiefly mindful of their own 
interests, which is but natural, they can have no such regard for the public welfare as is 
undoubtedly required.’ (Page 1924: 1265) It was Page’s view that the ‘important 
functions of banking can properly be performed only with guidance and control of a 
central bank.’  
 
 
Theodore and the Central Reserve Bank 
 
The government’s aim in 1924 was to re-create the Commonwealth Bank as Australia’s 
central bank, but the Bank continued to act primarily as a trading and savings bank. It 
was to take another thirty-five years before a separately constituted central bank was 
established in Australia. This occurred in 1959 when the central banking functions of the 
Commonwealth Bank were separated from the Bank’s commercial banking functions to 
form the RBA. Several decades had elapsed between the creation of a separate central 
bank in Australia and the establishment of similar banks in other major countries forming 
the British Empire – the Reserve Bank of South Africa was established in 1920;. the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1933; the Bank of Canada in 1934; and the Reserve 
Bank of India in 1935. Had the plan by the Commonwealth Treasurer, E.G. Theodore, to 
establish in 1930 a Central Reserve Bank (CRB) been adopted, Australia would have had 
a separate central bank at about the same time as these other countries. When it was 
established in 1959, the RBA took the structure of the CRB that had been foreshadowed 
by Theodore some thirty years before. 
 
With the failure of the Commonwealth Bank to act as a central bank following the 1924 
amendments, advice was sought from the Bank of England as to how the Bank might 
become a central bank. The Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, was 
invited by the chairman of the Commonwealth Bank’s board, Sir John Garvan, to visit 
Australia, but Norman declined the invitation. Instead, the Bank’s Comptroller (and later 
Deputy Governor), Sir Ernest Harvey, came to Australia in 1927 and held consultations 
with the Commonwealth Bank and the federal government. When he was in Australia, 
Harvey presented a public address to the Victorian Branch of the Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, in which he advanced ‘certain fundamental principles’ of 
central banking. (Harvey 1927: 3, 5) Though he did not refer directly to the 
Commonwealth Bank, it was obvious that where the Commonwealth Bank differed 
largely from these principles was its conduct of commercial banking activities. Harvey 
doubted whether a truly central bank should be engaged in such activities and for profit. 
If the Bank of England was the model to which all central banks should aspire, the 
commercial activities of the Commonwealth Bank were clearly an anomaly. Harvey 
argued that the ‘primary function’ of central banking – he preferred the term ‘central 
reserve banking’ – was ‘the custody, regulation and protection of the central banking and 
currency reserves of the country.’  Rather than each bank holding its own reserves, the 
banks’ reserves should be held centrally by an institution that could stand ready to 
provide liquidity to the system when a lack of confidence was depleting the banks’ 
deposits. A bank facing a run on its deposits would attempt sooner or later to liquidate its 
assets. But this could destabilize other banks. In these circumstances, what was needed   7
was a central reserve bank that could draw upon the reserves of the banking system as a 
whole to assist banks that were solvent but experiencing liquidity problems of a 
temporary nature.  
 
Harvey took the view that ‘The central bank, if its business has been conducted in 
conformity with the principles of true central banking, will probably not itself be 
involved in the causes which have rendered it necessary for other banks to turn to it for 
assistance, and it will be in a position to bring the whole weight of its resources to bear in 
any direction in which help is necessary.’ This obviously put the Commonwealth Bank at 
odds with the Bank of England’s conception of how a central bank should be constituted. 
For in conducting its own commercial activities, the Commonwealth Bank had deployed 
its funds in a somewhat similar portfolio of assets – including relatively illiquid 
investments – as the private banks. It was Harvey’s belief that a central bank should have 
its assets invested in short-term and highly liquid securities, not in mortgages on real 
estate, unsecured advances or overdrafts.  
 
Following Harvey’s visit, the question of whether the Commonwealth Bank could be 
considered a legitimate central bank was quickly taken up by Alfred Davidson, then 
Inspector for Western Australia of the Bank of New South Wales, and soon to become 
the bank’s General Manager in Sydney and the dominant private banker of the depression 
and immediate post-depression years. In a speech to the Western Australian branch of the 
Economics Society in 1928, Davidson declared that the Commonwealth Bank’s 
commercial and central bank functions were incompatible. (Davidson 1929: 31) As a 
consequence, he recommended that the Bank should withdraw from commercial banking, 
retaining only its central banking functions. The alternative was to establish a separate 
Central Reserve Bank, to which the Commonwealth Bank should surrender its present 
and limited central banking responsibilities. Davidson’s position was that, as long as the 
Commonwealth Bank accepted deposits from the public, it would fail to fulfill its 
responsibilities as a central bank. This conclusion does not appear to have been based 
explicitly upon any concern that Davidson may have had at the time that the 
Commonwealth Bank might use its privileged position as a central bank to compete 
unfairly against the private banks, and for that reason would never win the respect of the 
private banks. Rather, and following the principles laid down by the Bank of England’s 
representative, the difficulty was that the Commonwealth Bank, as a predominantly 
trading and savings bank, had its assets tied up in long-dated securities. If there were a 
run on the banks by distressed customers who were concerned about the security of their 
deposits, the Commonwealth Bank might find itself unable to act as lender of last resort 
to the banking system. While this might never eventuate in practice, Davidson 
nevertheless had identified a possible source of systemic weakness in the structure of a 
central bank that also operated as a commercial bank. ‘How can the Commonwealth 
Bank be a Bankers’ Bank and assist other Banks in time of stress’, Davidson asked, 
‘when it would be faced with a drain of many millions upon its public deposits together 
with a serious demand for increased advances from its borrowing customers, and at a 
time when many of its securities could not be in liquid form?’ Therefore he supported the 
‘best authorities’, who ‘point out that the Commonwealth Bank, as at present constituted, 
is not, and cannot be, a true Central Reserve Bank.’   8
 
It was remarked earlier that when the Commonwealth Bank opened its doors for business 
in 1912/1913 it possessed no central banking responsibilities other than that of banker to 
the federal government. It became in principle – though not in fact - both a commercial 
bank and a central bank with the amendments to the Commonwealth Bank Act in 1924.  
The government at that time does not appear to have contemplated the creation of a 
separate central bank by removing the commercial functions of the Commonwealth Bank. 
Nor did the Treasurer – Earle Page - seek to justify in parliament the benefits that might 
be derived from having a composite bank that combined central and commercial banking. 
He did assert, however, that  the Bank’s traditional policy of ‘not to enter into active 
rivalry with the trading banks’ was ‘fortunate…because by reason of the policy the 
conversion of the Commonwealth Bank has been rendered easier.’ (Page 1924: 1277) By 
this Page meant that he had detected no visible signs of resentment of the Commonwealth 
Bank by the private banks, as there might have been had the Commonwealth Bank acted 
as an aggressive competitor of the private trading banks. 
 
In 1928, and possibly as a result of the principles of central banking enunciated publicly 
by Sir Ernest Harvey, the government sought to put some distance between the central 
banking functions of the Commonwealth Bank and its savings bank activities by creating 
the Commonwealth Savings Bank. This was to have a separate administrative structure, 
though it would continue to share the same board of directors as the central banking and 
the trading bank functions of the Commonwealth Bank. The Bank had made no attempt, 
as Page explained, to attract existing trading bank customers away from the private 
banks, but rather had sought entirely new trading bank business. The growth of the 
Commonwealth Bank since its establishment in 1912 had derived principally from its 
savings bank activities, where it competed mainly against state-owned savings banks. In 
these circumstances, the private banks had seen no reason to feel threatened by the 
Bank’s commercial activities, though they were opposed to any compulsory lodging of 
reserves with the Bank on the grounds that these reserves might sometime in the future 
provide the means by which the Commonwealth Bank could compete more actively 
against them.  
 
An attempt had been made in 1924 to compel the private banks to lodge a proportion of 
their deposit liabilities with the Commonwealth Bank. But the government withdrew the 
provision from the proposed legislation when the banks vigorously opposed it. The 
government proceeded, however, with a requirement compelling the banks to clear their 
inter-bank balances by cheques drawn on the Commonwealth Bank. To facilitate this 
process, the banks began to deposit funds with the Commonwealth Bank. But the 
magnitude of these deposits was small, and they were made on an entirely voluntary 
basis. Further legislation late in 1929, at a time of growing economic instability, gave the 
Commonwealth Bank the power to requisition gold supplies in Australia; in exchange for 
gold, the banks received currency, which they deposited in part with the Commonwealth 
Bank. But these reserves, too, were not compulsory and could be withdrawn by the banks 
at short notice. The banks do not appear to have exhibited alarm at the idea of depositing 
funds at the Commonwealth Bank when it was convenient for them to do so; what was   9
now beginning to cause them some anxiety was the prospect that a potential rival might 
use the banks’ reserves to compete against them. 
 
At the peak of the depression in May 1930 the Treasurer, E.G. Theodore, introduced a 
bill into the federal parliament to create a Central Reserve Bank (CRB) along the lines 
that had been proposed earlier by Sir Ernest Harvey. (Theodore 1930: 123, 1334, 1335) 
The new institution was to be achieved by removing the central banking functions from 
the Commonwealth Bank and transferring them to the new central bank.  Theodore 
announced that the CRB would ‘operate for the maintenance of the stability and security 
of Australia’s monetary and credit system.’ There was ‘no sinister purpose behind the 
proposal’, he informed the parliament. ‘We are merely following a course that has been 
adopted in many other countries’. He dismissed the view, advanced by private bankers, 
that the Commonwealth Bank itself should become the central bank by jettisoning its 
commercial banking functions, arguing that ‘the Commonwealth Bank was established by 
its founders, and was carried on for a number of years, with an objective quite different 
from that desired in the establishment of a central reserve bank. The Commonwealth 
Bank was intended to be a trading institution, and to operate freely in competition with 
the private trading banks.’ While it was true that in 1924 ‘an attempt was made to enable 
it to develop into a central reserve bank’, Theodore argued that ‘it has not succeeded in 
fulfilling the functions of such an institution, and cannot be regarded as a central reserve 
bank.’ ‘The principal obstacle in the way of such a development’, he said, ‘was the 
attitude towards the Central Bank of the private trading banks.’ For the banks had 
‘declined to deposit any considerable portion of their reserves with it [the Commonwealth 
Bank], because they realized that such reserves might be used to further its active 
competition with them.’ This concern, Theodore considered, was perfectly 
understandable: ‘One cannot blame the managers and controllers of the private 
institutions for that attitude. They realized that in the Commonwealth Bank they had a 
competitor of tremendous power; and it was unreasonable to expect them to strengthen 
that competitor by handing over to it large proportions of their reserves.’ With 
remarkable foresight, Theodore had put his finger on the central issue that was to lead 
thirty years later to the separation of the central banking functions of the Commonwealth 
Bank from its commercial operations and to the establishment of the RBA, namely the 
resentment of the private banks to one of its competitors having responsibility for holding 
a significant proportion of their reserves in compulsory Special Accounts.  
 
Theodore’s bill to establish a separate central bank passed through the House of 
Representatives without fundamental objection. But it was defeated in the Senate, which 
was controlled by the Opposition with a large majority. For Theodore’s bill clearly had 
another purpose, which frightened those who feared that credit creation was tantamount 
to inflation, no matter what the current state of economic activity. ‘There is’, Theodore 
said,  ‘a generally held opinion among economists, bankers and financiers generally that 
our existing banks and financial system has proved defective, and that that has been 
partly responsible for the difficulties which Australia has encountered in the last year or 
two. The lack of the means for the mobilization of our credit resources has been a serious 
defect in our monetary system within recent months’. The board of the Commonwealth 
Bank, led by its powerful and dominant chairman, Sir Robert Gibson, had placed strict   10
limits upon the availability of central bank credit for the purpose of funding employment-
creating public works and assisting industries facing acute hardship. During the four 
years 1929-33 the Bank had discounted Treasury bills amounting to nearly ₤55 m. for the 
purpose of funding federal and state expenditure, but most of it was provided after the 
adoption of the Premiers’ Plan in 1931; indeed, most of it was provided in 1932 and 
1933, well after the peak of the depression had passed. The CRB would require a new 
board which, the government hoped, would be more accommodating to the government’s 
policy of Commonwealth Bank-funded public works programs than the board of the 
Bank had been. Moreover, the legislation provided for the compulsory lodging of banks’ 
reserve deposits with the CRB. It was felt by many – including the Opposition in the 
Senate – that these deposits would be used by the new central bank to fund profligate 
public works programs.  
 
 
Gibson and the Royal Commission on the Monetary and Banking Systems in 
Australia 
 
Sir Robert Gibson, a Melbourne businessman, who had chaired at the end of the war the 
Royal Commission ‘to consider and report upon the public expenditure of the 
Commonwealth of Australia with a view to effecting economies’, was a member of the 
original Commonwealth Bank Board appointed in 1924. When Garvan resigned in 1926 
due to ill-health, Gibson replaced him as chairman. According to Giblin, ‘Sir Robert had 
a clear and confident but somewhat imperfect vision of central banking problems in 
Australia; his assurance and dominance tended to reduce everyone else concerned on the 
staff or Board to the status of a rubber stamp.’ (Giblin, 1951: 353) During the depression, 
Gibson opposed devaluation, rejected deficit financing and fought against Theodore’s 
attempt to establish a separate central bank.  
 
At the federal election in 1934 the Labor and Country Parties campaigned for an inquiry 
into the Australian monetary and banking systems. They were highly critical of the role 
played by the banking system before and during the depression and were especially 
critical of the performance of the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank, asserting that 
over-investment in Australia in the nineteen-twenties had helped to promote the 
depression and that the contraction of credit during the depression had exaggerated its 
extent and delayed recovery. Rather than adopting measures to initiate recovery, the Bank 
had attempted to maintain an overvalued exchange rate, and had withheld funds for the 
provision of government relief works and assistance to farmers. During the election, the 
government of J.A. Lyons rejected these calls for a review of the financial system. But 
the government lost its majority at the election and was forced into a coalition with the 
Country Party. The new government, again led by Lyons, agreed to establish a Royal 
Commission to review the Australian monetary and banking systems. Chaired by Justice 
John Mellis Napier of the South Australian Supreme Court, the Royal Commission 
included a future Prime Minister (J.B. Chifley) and one of Australia’s leading economists 
(Professor R.C. Mills, Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Sydney); its 
economic adviser (J.G. Phillips) later became Governor of the RBA. It took submissions 
from 318 persons, including bankers, financiers, public officials and virtually all of the   11
country’s leading economists. Its report contained thirty recommendations and was 
highly influential in setting the agenda for much of the debate on central banking over the 
succeeding twenty years. In many ways the Royal Commission was the equal of the next 
major review of the Australian financial system, the Inquiry into the Australian Financial 
System (the Campbell Inquiry), which reported in 1981. (Australia 1937) 
 
The Royal Commission called for the creation of a strong central bank, one equipped 
with adequate policy instruments to regulate economic activity and stabilize the banking 
system. It spent considerable time examining the nature and causes of the depression and 
the role of monetary policy, concluding that ‘No action by the monetary and banking 
system of Australia could have avoided some depression, although the system together 
with governments, and indeed, the community as a whole, must share some responsibility 
for the extent of the depression. The development of boom conditions could have been 
checked, and the depth of the depression could have been lessened. Monetary measures 
alone did not produce recovery, but their effects would have been greater had they been 
taken earlier.’ (Australia 1937: 209)  
 
Focusing specifically on monetary policy, the Royal Commission judged that: ‘Two of 
the most important monetary measures taken during the depression were the expansion of 
central bank credit by means of treasury-bills in 1931 and 1932, and the movement in the 
exchange rate in January 1931. In each case, in our opinion, the depression would have 
been lightened, and some of its worst effects avoided, if these measures had been taken 
earlier.’ (Australia 1937: 211) The Commission argued strongly for greater control and 
regulation of the Australian monetary and banking systems, recommending that the banks 
should operate upon the authority of a licence, which could be withdrawn if a bank failed 
to follow government policy. The banks should be compelled to hold at the central bank 
an undefined percentage of their deposits, which might be varied according to the 
requirements of monetary policy. Further, the policy of the Commonwealth Bank should 
be subordinate to the government, and the Bank should conduct its policy with a view to 
stabilizing the business cycle rather than aiming at price stability or a fixed exchange rate. 
The Commission believed there were benefits to be gained by the central bank retaining 
its commercial banking functions, proposing that the Bank’s trading and savings 
activities should be used to expand or contract the amount of credit in the economy as a 
whole. 
 
One of the Royal Commission’s major conclusions was that the Commonwealth Bank 
lacked the policy instruments required to achieve its objectives. It noted that the Bank had 
rarely, if ever, engaged in discounting bills, other than government bonds that were about 
to mature. The Bank’s spokesmen informed the Commission that the Bank’s failure to 
undertake market operations was because the secondary market for government securities 
was narrow and extensive operations would significantly affect the price of government 
paper and hence interest rates. The Commission, however, doubted that the secondary 
market for Treasury bills was inadequate for the purpose of conducting open market 
operations. It had no doubt that the market was indeed somewhat thin, ‘but its extent 
depends upon so many circumstances that no estimate can safely be made of the amount 
of securities which could be sold at any time without seriously affecting their price.’   12
(Australia 1937: 226) The Commission proposed that the authorities should act to create 
an open market for government securities, which would be offered to the public on a 
regular basis through public tender at rates determined by the tenders that were received. 
It admitted that such a market would have to be established gradually, and that its success 
would depend on the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy.  
 
The Commonwealth Bank argued before the Commission that the banks should be 
compelled to lodge with the Bank a fixed minimum percentage of their deposit liabilities 
and, further, that the Bank should possess the authority to draw upon the banks’ overseas 
reserves. These powers would allow the Bank to buy securities in Australia and foreign 
exchange in London, thereby permitting it to control both domestic credit expansion and 
the exchange rate. As the report of the Royal Commission explained: ‘the necessity to 
maintain not less than a certain fixed percentage of their liabilities to the public with the 
Commonwealth Bank would force the banks to borrow occasionally from the 
Commonwealth Bank and thus strengthen the Commonwealth Bank’s control of their 
credit policy.’ (Australia 1937: 227) But as they had done on earlier occasions, the 
trading banks opposed the idea of mandatory reserve deposits lodged at the central bank, 
claiming that they would have to hold more of their assets in cash if part of their reserves 
were surrendered to the Bank; this, in turn, would induce higher interest rates. 
Additionally, if there were a fixed minimum of deposits that the banks would have to 
lodge at the Bank, as the Commonwealth Bank proposed, difficulties would inevitably 
arise when seasonal conditions were tight. 
 
The Royal Commission recommended that the regulation of credit by the Bank should be 
conducted primarily by the Bank establishing close co-operation with the trading banks – 
what, at a later time, was referred to as ‘suasion’. Believing, however, that the necessary 
co-operation with the trading banks might not always be obtainable, the Commission 
further recommended that the banks should be compelled to keep an unspecified 
minimum proportion of their deposits with the Commonwealth Bank, the actual 
proportion to be determined by the Bank, with the consent of the Treasurer, for a period 
that could not exceed six months without obtaining further authority from the Treasurer. 
The percentage could be varied according to monetary conditions: increased when 
monetary conditions needed to be tightened, and reduced when conditions could be 
eased. The same percentage was to apply to all the banks, regardless of their particular 
circumstances. Attempts, however, in the late 1930s by the Treasurer, R.G. Casey, to 
introduce legislation compelling banks to lodge a minimum of 7½ per cent (earlier drafts 
had mentioned a ratio of 10 per cent) of their deposit liabilities at the Bank failed as a 
result of intense pressure brought to bear on the government by the banks, which lobbied 
furiously to have the draft legislation shelved. A somewhat different system was 
introduced on a voluntary basis by the Fadden government in 1941 and made compulsory 
under the National Security (Defence) Regulations shortly after the Curtin government 
came to power in October 1941. In the event, no effort was made before the war to sell 
government securities by public tender, though it is probable that attempts were made by 
the Bank to apply suasion in the hope that the banks would adhere to monetary policy.  
 
Melville and the Creation of a New Monetary Framework   13
 
Virtually nothing is known of the consultations undertaken by Sir Ernest Harvey with the 
board of the Commonwealth Bank in 1927, though it is probable that Harvey drew the 
Bank’s attention to its lack of technical expertise. When Sir Otto Niemeyer and Professor 
T.E. Gregory visited Australia from the Bank of England in 1930 they appear to have 
advised the Commonwealth Bank to appoint an economist to its staff. The following year 
the Bank appointed Professor Leslie Melville of the University of Adelaide as its first 
Economist (later Economic Adviser). Melville quickly established the Economist’s 
Department in the Bank and recruited professional economists to it; in 1935 he appointed 
Dr H.C. Coombs to be his assistant. (Cornish 1993) 
 
When Melville was appointed to the Commonwealth Bank, perhaps on the 
recommendation of Niemeyer, and certainly with the approval of Gibson, he was 
regarded as the most conservative of Australia’s senior economists. As early as 1927 he 
predicted that Australia was heading toward major economic trouble, and by 1929/30 he 
was arguing that the depression constituted a real decline in output and that this had to be 
accepted by cutting real wages and government expenditure. (Cornish 1999; Macfarlane 
2002) Yet Melville also supported devaluation, which he considered was necessary to 
boost the incomes of farmers and enable local production to compete in international 
markets. He conceded that, in the short run at least, some central bank funding of 
government expenditure was necessary through the issue of Treasury bills, though he 
argued that the issue should be limited and funded at the earliest opportunity.  
 
By the mid-1930s Melville was expressing concern about the pace of recovery and 
proposed that Treasury bills should now be funded, for in the hands of commercial banks 
they would be treated as liquid assets, thereby providing the basis for further credit 
expansion. This matter was the subject of considerable debate among Australian 
economists at the time. The majority tended to dismiss Melville’s concerns, contending 
that as unemployment remained high there was little possibility of inflation arising from 
unfunded Treasury bills. On the question of returning to some sort of gold standard or 
gold exchange standard, an aim that Gibson supported, Melville was totally opposed to 
the idea; while he supported exchange stability in the short term, he believed that a gold 
standard arrangement, by which external adjustment was obtained through domestic 
deflation, was altogether too inflexible. He was keen for the central bank to play a 
decisive role in the formulation of monetary policy, not just in its execution, and he 
supported the development of open market operations by the Bank through the buying 
and selling of government securities with the object of stabilizing prices and economic 
activity. An attempt in 1936 by the Commonwealth Bank to sell securities on the open 
market for the purpose of moderating activity failed, however, when the Bank of New 
South Wales decided to circumvent the policy by raising interest rates on its fixed 
deposits. 
 
Melville’s approach to domestic monetary and exchange rate policy was elaborated at 
length in his Statement and testimony to the Royal Commission in 1936. (Melville 1936: 
1117-30) The Commonwealth Bank’s decision at the end of 1931 to control the exchange 
rate, and its policy to preserve a fixed rate of exchange with sterling, constituted an   14
important step toward the operation of central banking in Australia. To maintain a fixed 
rate of exchange, the Bank extended its agreement with the banks, negotiated during the 
depression, to mobilize their London reserves for the purpose of meeting government 
debt obligations in London. Maintaining a fixed rate of exchange with sterling also meant 
that the Bank had to set domestic monetary policy in such a way that exchange stability 
could be preserved. From late 1931 until the early 1970s, the authorities in Australia 
adhered to a monetary framework that centered on maintaining a stable – though not an 
absolutely fixed - exchange rate in terms of sterling. There was only one occasion when 
this policy failed to be observed: sterling was devalued in 1967 but the Australian dollar 
was not.  
 
The exchange rate with sterling was preserved after 1931 as a result of monetary and 
fiscal policy being applied to manage the level of aggregate domestic demand. In the 
short term, the level of Australia’s foreign reserves – augmented by foreign borrowing – 
was allowed to fluctuate, reflecting excessive or deficient domestic demand and other 
forces operating on the balance of payments. But sooner or later the stance of monetary, 
and perhaps more especially fiscal policy, was altered for the purpose of easing pressures 
on the exchange rate. Though this new sterling-exchange standard was not strictly a gold 
standard, since the exchange rate was not immutably fixed to gold, it served to provide a 
nominal anchor for the Australian monetary system, since to maintain exchange stability, 
the authorities were obliged to formulate and implement domestic monetary and fiscal 
policy aimed at retaining the fixed rate with sterling. 
 
The elements of this monetary framework were carefully articulated by Melville in his 
Statement to the Royal Commission. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the economic 
policy process, Melville argued that there was a need to simplify it by adopting simple 
rules. It was necessary, he said, to ‘select one factor in the economy and attempt to fix it, 
at the same time endeavouring, as far as possible, to make every other factor in the 
economy adapt itself to the fixed factor.’ But what should be the fixed factor? ‘Having 
regard to the necessity for Australia to trade on friendly terms with other countries, her 
need for overseas capital, and the convenience of traders and financiers’, Melville 
concluded that ‘it seems best in her case to fix the exchange rate and adapt the economy 
to that fixed rate.’ In these circumstances, domestic policy would be guided in large 
measure by the level of the foreign reserves; monetary policy would be eased when the 
reserves rose, and tightened when the reserves fell. This did not mean that policy settings 
should be altered immediately the level of reserves changed. ‘Were ample funds 
available’, he said, ‘ ‘we should watch the progress of a fall, or rise, for some time, and 
test it by examining other statistics in order to decide whether it was only a temporary 
movement, or whether we must expect it to continue indefinitely. In the former case no 
action need be taken to adapt the internal economy to the altered conditions. We should 
wait until London funds [Australian banks’ reserves held in London] were in due course 
restored to their original level. In the second case there would need to be a contraction, or 
expansion, of credit – gentle at first, but applied with increasing severity until the internal 
economy had been suitably modified.’ Given Melville’s desire for a relatively stable 
exchange rate, the rise or fall in the foreign reserves – by placing pressure on the 
exchange rate – would signal the need for an expansion or contraction of monetary   15
policy. Importantly, Melville admitted that the nexus between the foreign reserves and 
domestic monetary expansion or contraction should not be left simply to automatic 
processes, or to the decisions of the trading banks, which had been the case in the past. 
For there would inevitably be times when the expansion and contraction of credit 
overshot the mark, ‘unless there is a Central Bank waiting, properly equipped, to guide 
the economy as smoothly as possible.’ 
 
While Melville recommended that the exchange rate should provide the anchor – or 
‘compass’, to use his own expression – around which monetary and other policy settings 
should be adjusted or guided, this did not mean that he was advocating a fixed rate of 
exchange in all conditions. On the contrary, there would doubtless occur from time to 
time ‘exceptional circumstances’ when the exchange rate would have to be altered.  In 
short, there should be short-term stability, but the rate should not be fixed absolutely, as 
was the case in a gold standard system.  This policy framework later came to be known 
more generally as the Bretton Woods system. Melville himself led the Australian 
delegation to the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and was closely associated with 
Giblin, Coombs and others in the development of Australia’s policy toward the Keynes-
White plans for the international monetary system following the end of the war. It was no 
surprise therefore that Melville should become a powerful advocate of Australia’s 
adoption of the Bretton Wood’s system, though he much regretted that the more 
expansive Keynes plan (the Clearing Union) had generally been subverted in the creation 
of the International Monetary Fund by the more restrictive Stabilization Fund sponsored 
by the United States Treasury. 
 
Chifley and the Creation of the Regulatory Regime 
 
Many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission were adopted during the Second 
World War under emergency war-time regulations. They were made permanent 
subsequently by legislation passed in 1945. In that year, two bank bills were enacted: the 
Commonwealth Bank Act, which completely rewrote existing legislation relating to the 
nature and structure of the Commonwealth Bank; and the Banking Act, which contained 
a comprehensive set of regulations that were to apply to the Australian monetary and 
banking system. (Chifley 1945: 547, 557). These regulations drew in part upon the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission, including the mandatory holding of reserve 
deposits with the central bank. In reality, however, they went far beyond the 
Commission’s proposals, embracing the stronger and deeper control regime that had been 
adopted during the war.  
 
The controls and regulations contained within the 1945 legislation formed the basis of the 
Australian financial system from the Second World War until the 1980s, determining its 
structure and operation. At the centre of the regulatory regime was the Special Accounts 
system (after 1959, the Statutory Reserve Deposit (SRD) ratio). Unlike the 
recommendation of the Royal Commission, which had specified a minimum but variable 
system of reserve deposits based on a proportion of bank deposits or liabilities, the 
wartime system of Special Accounts allowed the central bank to call up to 100 percent of 
any increase in bank assets from a nominated date. According to the Banking Act, the   16
private trading banks were to lodge in their Special Account at the Commonwealth Bank 
each month no more than the wartime accumulation of assets in Special Accounts, plus 
any increase in the bank’s assets from the commencement of the provisions of the Act. 
The central bank was to notify banks in writing each month the Special Account 
requirements for each bank. The banks would be paid a nominal rate of interest (less than 
one per cent a year) on their lodgments, and they were unable to withdraw funds without 
the authority of the Bank; such withdrawals could attract a penalty rate of interest. 
 
When he introduced the Commonwealth Bank Bill into the parliament in 1945, the 
Treasurer (and soon to become Prime Minister following the death of John Curtin), J.B. 
Chifley, highlighted the deflationary circumstances of the depression, the expected 
postwar slump (depressions had followed the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War), 
and the likely inflationary pressures that would be experienced immediately after the war 
as a result of pent-up demand and excessive bank liquidity. (Chifley 1945: 557) He 
explained that the proposed legislation was ‘based on the conviction that the Government 
must accept responsibility for the economic condition of the nation. The problems of the 
postwar period – of employment, development and trade, are of such magnitude, and 
involve such serious consequences, that no other attitude could be maintained. 
Accordingly’, Chifley went on, ‘the Government has decided to assume the powers 
which are necessary over banking policy to assist it in maintaining national economic 
health and prosperity.’ With echoes of Theodore and the Royal Commission, he declared 
that it was the ‘opinion of the Government’ that ‘the Commonwealth Bank and the 
banking system should have done more to mitigate the distress of the depression years.’ 
‘The present Government’, he said, ‘is determined to ensure, so far as it lies within its 
power, that this will not be repeated.’ As to the Banking Bill, which contained the 
collection of new peacetime measures designed to regulate the banking and monetary 
systems, Chifley explained that the ‘main purposes of the provisions is clear. They are 
intended to equip the Commonwealth Bank with adequate powers to supervise the 
banking system…No responsible government could afford to move forward into the post-
war period without adequate means at its disposal to cope with inflationary and 
deflationary movements in the monetary and banking system.’ 
 
Shortly after the 1945 legislation was passed a challenge in the High Court of Australia 
by the Melbourne City Council to Section 48 of the Banking Act – which required certain 
public authorities to hold accounts with the Commonwealth Bank – raised the possibility 
that other and more vital provisions of the legislation might be challenged in the courts. 
In particular, there were fears that the private banks might challenge those sections of the 
Banking Act that dealt with the Special Accounts procedure, which was expected after 
the war to be used as the main instrument for the control of bank liquidity. As a member 
of the Royal Commission in 1936-37, Chifley had written a minority report proposing the 
abolition of private banking, on the grounds that private banks were more concerned with 
making profits than promoting the public welfare. (Australia 1937: 262-8) Now, as 
Treasurer and Prime Minister, he introduced a bill into the parliament in 1947 making it 
illegal for privately-owned institutions to undertake banking in Australia. As he explained 
to the Parliament: ‘It would be disastrous, from the point of view of the people of 
Australia and the prospects of economic stability, if sections 18-24 of the Banking Act   17
[those sections providing for the Special Accounts system] were held to be invalid and 
the consequent loss of control over the banking system led to an inflation of credit, with 
all the loss and disorder which inflation entails.’ (Chifley 1947: 799, 802) 
 
When seeking to justify the government’s decision to nationalize banking in Australia, 
Chifley referred again to the depression of the 1930s, claiming that ‘the banks as a whole 
restricted new lending and called in advances’, and the result was ‘to accentuate the 
contraction of business and the unemployment of those years. They helped but little in 
recovery during the ‘thirties, waiting rather for improvement to come from other sources 
instead of taking the initiative and helping to promote recovery. They followed these 
courses because it seemed best and safest from the standpoint of their own interests.’ The 
1945 legislation had sought to control the private banks in the interest of preserving 
monetary stability. But the possibility of a threat of legal action aimed at the chief 
mechanism for credit control – the Special Accounts system – rendered it necessary, 
Chifley asserted, to remove banking from private ownership and place it in public hands. 
In the event, the attempt to nationalize the private banks failed when first the High Court 
of Australia, and then the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, declared 
the enabling legislation to be unconstitutional. Nationalization of banking having failed, 
the government then reverted to its former course, which was to control the banks 
through the operation of a powerful central bank and the application of extensive 
regulatory measures. 
 
Chifley continued to be influenced in his approach to monetary and banking 
arrangements by his understanding of the Commonwealth Bank’s failure to avert 
economic disaster in the early 1930s. When the newly elected Liberal-Country Party 
government announced in 1950 that it proposed to reintroduce a board of directors for the 
Commonwealth Bank, Labor having replaced the board in 1945 by an Advisory Council 
of Bank and Treasury officials, Chifley, now the Leader of the Opposition, vowed that he 
would oppose any attempt to re-impose a board of directors upon the Bank along the lines 
of the board that had existed from 1924 to 1945. Labor would not object to a board 
composed of ‘a number of prominent public servants and economists who have no 
interest in private enterprise.’ (Chifley 1950: 60, 61) But it would have no hesitation in 
opposing a board comprised of persons who had ‘certain social or business affiliations’. 
He continued to blame the board of the late-1920s-early-1930s for much of the distress 
that Australia had experienced during the depression. ‘I do not suggest that the 
Commonwealth Bank Board at that time could have prevented the financial and 
economic depression that occurred in Australia – indeed, it could not have done so’. But 
he believed ‘it could have alleviated the effects by perhaps 75 per cent.’ Specifically, he 
was convinced that ‘a great deal of the responsibility for that situation…may be laid at 
the door of those who were not elected to the Commonwealth Bank Board by the general 
public or even by the Parliament, but were appointed by the Government of the day.’ He 
could never understand how some of the people were appointed to the Board at that time: 
‘I can only surmise that they were very pleasant fellows at cocktail parties and similar 
functions’; ‘most of them were definitely associated with private enterprise, and their 
business was to restrict the operations of the Commonwealth Bank.’ The Labor 
Opposition upheld its leader’s threat to block the government’s amendments in the   18
Senate. After a second vote, the Senate rejected the legislation again. The government 
then invoked section 57 of the Australian Constitution and was granted a double 
dissolution of Parliament by the Governor-General. At the general election that followed, 
the government was returned with majorities in both houses of Parliament. The 
legislation was then reintroduced and was subsequently passed. 
 
Coombs and the Problems of Central Banking  
 
The years immediately preceding and following the 1945 bank legislation saw the high 
watermark of monetary and banking regulation in Australia. During this time, H.C. 
Coombs, first as adviser to Chifley, and later as Governor of the central bank, was a 
powerful influence in the determination of monetary policy. (Coombs 1981; Rowse 2002; 
Cornish 2007) He generally supported the 1945 legislation as the alternative to bank 
nationalization, though he disagreed with key provisions of the legislation. He 
emphatically opposed bank nationalization in 1947. As Governor of the central bank, he 
allowed the banks greater control over the management of their liquidity, tried to 
introduce market-based processes of monetary policy when problems associated with the 
application of direct controls began to be experienced, and warned as early as 1959 of the 
dangers of stagflation. 
 
At the end of 1948, Coombs was appointed by Chifley to be the next Governor of the 
Commonwealth Bank. He served in this position until January 1960, when he became the 
first Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, retiring from the post in 1968. At the 
beginning of the war he had moved from Assistant Economist at the Commonwealth 
Bank to fill the new position of Economist at the Treasury in Canberra. When Labor 
came to power in October 1941 and set up an Office of Rationing as part of its New 
Economic Policy, Coombs was appointed to head the Office. In February 1943 he was 
appointed Director-General of Chifley’s new Department of Postwar Reconstruction, 
resigning from it to take up the position of Governor of the Commonwealth Bank on 1 
January 1949. He is regarded as the principal architect of Australia’s postwar policy of 
full employment and the country’s leading adherent of Keynesian policy. Together with 
Giblin and Melville, Coombs formulated Australia’s international economic policy in the 
1940s, the so-called ‘Positive Approach’ or ‘Full Employment Approach’. Responding to 
Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, signed initially between the United States and 
the United Kingdom, and later between the United States and other countries including 
Australia, the ‘Positive Approach’ embodied a defensive policy designed to safeguard 
employment in Australia when discriminatory trade and payments barriers were 
dismantled after the war in accordance with Article VII. In essence, the policy was to 
promote a high level of activity internationally by inserting a commitment to full 
employment into the charters of the new multilateral institutions that were to operate after 
the war, among them the IMF/World Bank, the United Nations and the proposed 
International Trade Organization. (Cornish 1992) 
 
Having dedicated himself to the achievement and preservation of full employment in 
Australia and elsewhere, it is an irony that the major problem that confronted Coombs 
throughout his time as Governor of the central bank was over-full employment and   19
inflation. Yet contrary to what might be supposed, he was perhaps the most dedicated 
anti-inflationist in government service throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Even before he 
was appointed Governor, he had expressed concern about inflation. In 1948 he presented 
a paper to the summer school of the New South Wales Branch of the Economic Society 
of Australia and New Zealand entitled ‘Australia’s ability to avoid booms and 
depressions’. In the paper, Coombs was critical of the failure of economic decision-
makers (government ministers) and some of their advisers – those in the Treasury in 
particular – to understand the approach to policy adopted in the Curtin government’s 
white paper on full employment issued in 1945. (Coombs 1948) He pointed out that the 
framework of the white paper, like that of Keynes’s General Theory, provided for 
circumstances both of under-full employment and over-full employment (Cornish 1981). 
In 1948 there was clearly excess demand in Australia; inflation had reached an annual 
rate approaching ten per cent, and the government ought to have been pursuing policies 
directed at easing pressures in labour markets. Above all, there should have been fiscal 
and monetary restraint. In 1949, as Governor of the Bank, Coombs argued that Australia 
should not follow sterling and devalue against the $US by the full 30 per cent proposed 
by Britain; rather it should devalue by something less than that. In this way the ₤A would 
depreciate against the $US, but would appreciate against sterling and the rest of the 
Sterling Area. However, the government rejected Coombs’s advice and devalued by the 
full 30%, at a time when unfilled vacancies for labour exceeded the numbers registered as 
unemployed. 
 
Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, Coombs sought to achieve two objectives: to 
draw attention to the dangers of inflation, and to make monetary policy more effective. 
His advice in 1949 regarding the exchange rate was based on his concern about the 
inflationary consequences of an excessive devaluation. (Coombs 1981: 149-50; Cornish 
1993).Again in 1950, when the effects of the 1949 devaluation, and the even greater 
inflationary impulses unleashed by the Korean war, were beginning to be felt, he advised 
the government to revalue the ₤A, tighten monetary policy by calling up additional bank 
assets to the Special Accounts and lifting interest rates, and strengthen fiscal policies by 
raising taxes and cutting government expenditure. These proposals were at first opposed 
by the Treasury and rejected by the government. Some of them were finally introduced in 
the ‘Horror Budget’ of 1951, but by then it was too late, the Korean War boom having 
broken. As the economy began to slide into recession, and with unemployment appearing 
for the first time since the war, Coombs was then required to formulate a reflationary 
program. 
 
By the mid-1950s it had become clear to Coombs that the chief monetary instrument that 
had been devised to combat inflation – the Special Accounts system – was defective. For 
a start, the Australian trading banks, unlike their counterparts in many other countries, did 
not adhere to a common liquidity standard; some banks adopted lower liquidity ratios 
than others. As a result, an increase in the call to Special Accounts aimed at tightening 
the availability of credit was often circumvented by banks with high liquidity conventions 
simply reducing their liquidity ratios. Even those banks with low liquidity standards acted 
to reduce their liquidity levels still further. To obviate this problem, Coombs secured 
agreement with the banks for a minimum liquidity convention – the so-called LGS (liquid   20
assets and government securities) convention. An increase in the call to Special Accounts 
(after 1959, Special Reserve Deposits or SRD’s) would put pressure on the LGS 
convention; if a bank’s liquidity ratio fell below the LGS convention, it was obliged to 
borrow from the central bank, possibly at a penal rate. (Coombs 1971: 27-43) 
 
With one problem solved, another soon appeared. Coombs realized that the SRD/LGS 
system and other bank regulations (including qualitative and quantitative lending 
directives, and interest rate and maturity controls on loans and deposits) were inhibiting 
the opportunity of banks to compete against non-banking financial institutions (NBFI’s), 
which were not regulated by the central bank. Finance companies, hire purchase 
companies, building societies, short-term money market operators and merchant banks 
expanded rapidly from the early 1950s. In part, this was the natural outcome of new 
consumer demands and the growing diversification of the nation’s economic base. But 
part of the growth of NBFI’s arose because the banks were constrained by regulations 
such as ceilings on the rates of interest they could offer to depositors and charge on loans; 
maturity controls; central bank advice that restricted loans to designated activities; and 
the compulsory absorption of assets/deposits in Special Accounts and LGS assets. 
Whatever the reason for the growth of NBFI’s, their activities eroded the effectiveness of 
the Bank’s monetary policies. This was because the Australian Constitution gave the 
Commonwealth – of which the central bank was a part – authority over banks but not 
over NBFI’s. Soon the banks themselves acquired NBFI affiliates, to which they directed 
their customers; they also devised new financial instruments, such as bank endorsed and 
accepted commercial bills, which, because they were not included on banks’ balance 
sheets, were not subjected to direct controls. Further, disintermediation grew as a strong 
inter-company market developed as a result of the restrictions on the activities of banks. 
Finally, limitations on bank lending encouraged borrowers to look increasingly overseas 
for funds, particularly in the new Euro-dollar markets that were opening up. 
 
Coombs was extremely sensitive to these developments and their consequences for the 
operation of monetary policy. (Coombs 1971: 27-43, 44-56) To circumvent the 
diminishing impact of monetary policy as the NBFIs expanded more rapidly than the 
banks, Coombs favoured the application of market procedures, such as open market 
operations. The decision by the Bank in 1959 to encourage the development of an official 
short-term money market by extending lender of last resort and other central bank 
privileges to a number of authorized discount houses was an important step in this 
direction; so was the Bank’s support for a more diverse supply of short-dated government 
securities. However government and Treasury policy aimed at keeping interest rates 
below market clearing levels limited the effectiveness of open market operations. 
Frequently, the Bank was required to purchase government securities for the purpose of 
shoring up the price of government paper. The result was that, at times when the 
monetary authorities should have been draining the financial system of liquidity, they 
were actually adding to liquidity. As Coombs explained in his R.C. Mills Memorial 
Lecture in 1958: the Bank in 1950/51 and 1951/52, at the height of the Korean War 
inflation, was obliged to purchase government securities on the open market to prevent a 
decline in the price of bonds; instead of deflating activity,  the Bank was stimulating it. 
(Coombs 1971: 31, 32) ‘It would be pleasant to be able to record’, he said, ‘that when the   21
problem [of inflation] recurred in 1954/55 the Bank was able promptly to resolve the 
issue and to avoid adding to the money supply – limiting its purchases on the market and 
accepting the higher level of yields which this implied…In fact, however, while the 
character of the dilemma was recognized from an early stage, the claims of low interest 
rates and stability of prices of government securities were difficult to resist. The process 
of resolving the dilemma was slow – indeed resembling what in another context has been 
called “an agonizing re-appraisal”, and it was not until early in 1956 that Central Bank 
support for the market was reduced to normal amounts.’ His conclusion was that 
‘Effective open market operations by the Central Bank in the restraint of inflation 
are…unlikely unless we adopt more flexible attitudes towards interest rates.’ Invariably it 
was Coombs who put the case to the government for greater flexibility in the setting of 
rates on government securities. But he was frequently opposed by the Treasury and the 
government; without such flexibility, it was impossible to apply open-market operations 
systematically. 
 
Of the growth of NBFI’s, Coombs explained in a series of public lectures that their 
expansion had increased the velocity of circulation of money; the considerable rise in 
aggregate expenditure in recent years, he argued, ‘was largely financed by a more 
frequent use of the existing money supply rather than from an increase in the volume of 
money itself’. (Coombs 1971: 40) He pointed to statistics that showed a persistent decline 
in the ratio of money to nominal income, suggesting that NBFI’s had been instrumental in 
increasing the turnover or velocity of money. ‘Expressed in general terms this has meant’, 
he said, that ‘the banking system has been becoming a less significant element in the 
financing of the economy. This is not necessarily a bad thing…But it does mean that to 
the extent that monetary policy relies primarily upon action through the banking system it 
is operating in a steadily contracting field.’ In his Sir James Morris Memorial Lecture in 
1962, Coombs asked the question: ‘Why has the post-war period seen such a proliferation 
of new financial institutions?’ Responding to the question, Coombs replied that ‘It is 
sometimes argued that the emergence and growth of this multiplicity of financial 
agencies reflects the rigidity of official banking policy; that the strict limitations on the 
freedom of bank lending has caused the banks to confine their loans more and more to the 
narrow provision of working capital on overdraft and to contract out of more adventurous 
and particularly longer-term classes of business: that limitations on the freedom of banks 
to pay interest on fixed deposits have left depositors with too limited opportunities to earn 
a return on surplus funds and have encouraged them to turn elsewhere. Correspondingly, 
business enterprises faced by unresponsive bankers and concerned at the periodical 
intensification of restrictive credit policy have sought other channels of access to other 
people’s money they need for their businesses.’ (Coombs 1971: 49-50) Coombs 
supported this interpretation of events, concluding that the application of direct controls 
‘no doubt…encouraged this tremendous expansion of other financial institutions and that 
every stage in that expansion limits the area to which official monetary policy directly 
applies.’ 
 
Having identified by the late-1950s (and even earlier in some cases) the central problems 
facing monetary policy in Australia, and having fought a long battle to render the 
adoption of open market operations more effective, Coombs then began to focus on the   22
nature and consequences of inflation. He drew attention to the problem in ‘A Matter of 
Prices’, his Presidential Address to the Australian and New Zealand Association for the 
Advancement of Science (ANZAAS) conference held in Perth in 1959. (Coombs 1971: 
117, 118, 120, 128) There he pointed out that inflation seemed to have settled at about 3 
per cent a year. That might not seem a great problem in itself. But what was of decidedly 
greater concern to him was that ‘a significant new factor appears to have entered the 
situation’, namely ‘a widespread acceptance of price increases of this order as natural and 
inevitable.’ ‘An important reason for believing that this trend of prices does in fact 
represent a significant and continuing element in our economic climate’, he said, ‘is the 
experience of the United States during the recent business recession when, despite the 
fact that almost every indicator of economic activity turned downwards, consumer prices 
continued to rise.’ Between August 1957 and April 1958, the index of industrial 
production in the United States fell by 13 per cent, retail sales fell by 5 per cent and 
unemployment almost doubled, but the consumer price index and wages rose by almost 3 
per cent. The coincidence of falling activity and rising prices, Coombs explained, was 
something new, for in ‘the past, periods of declining economic activity have almost 
invariably brought falling prices.’ This deeply worried him, for, as he put it, ‘If this 
change in the relationship of price movements to other indicators is due to continuing 
factors, it would bring about a vital change in people’s attitudes towards prices – a 
change which could have profound economic effects’. As he continued: ‘Previously, even 
if people felt that the long-term trend would be upwards, they had to take into account 
that there would be times when prices would fall. This probability introduced some 
uncertainty into any assessment they were making. In other words, while the long-term 
trend of prices might be upwards, any judgment relating to a particular period had always 
to allow for the possibility of a fall. This prevented people from being able to plan on the 
assumption of continuously rising prices. Recent experience suggests that this may be no 
longer true.’ Here, Coombs had plainly identified both the problem of stagflation and the 
concept of inflationary expectations. 
 
Coombs had no immediate solutions to offer. Yet he was adamant that the ‘longer prices 
continue to rise – however slowly – and the more confident become the expectations of 
further rises, the more people will seek protection and the more expensive it will become. 
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive an upward trend of prices remaining slow and gradual in 
a world where everybody is seeking to protect himself against its effects’. For Coombs, 
the combination of price inflation and recession raised an acute policy dilemma: to which 
objective – inflation or unemployment – should monetary policy be directed. As he put it, 
there was now a ‘conflict of objectives’. ‘The Commonwealth Bank, for example, is 
required by law to pursue a policy which will best contribute to the maintenance of full 
employment and to the stability of the currency. These are the basic objectives of 
monetary policy in practically all democratic countries. If there is a tendency for prices to 
rise, the monetary authorities may feel obliged to impose a restrictive credit policy even 
though such a policy may prevent the emergence of full employment.’ 
 
So concerned was he about this new dispensation of inflation and unemployment 
occurring simultaneously that Coombs was convinced that ‘we should receive, with grave 
scepticism, pronouncements which suggest that we do not need to worry about prices. A   23
persistent tendency for prices to rise may, like the housemaid’s baby, be very small at 
first – but once people have got used to it being around, they may well be astonished at 
how rapidly it will grow.’ ‘It does matter’, he declared,  ‘if prices continue to rise – the 
trend is a serious and growing threat to the health of our economy; if it continues 
uninterrupted there is a grave danger that it will gather momentum from the efforts of 
people to protect themselves from its effects and cease to be merely a “creeping 
inflation”.’ Monetary policy therefore had to become more effective and that meant 
greater use of open market operations.  
 
From the middle of the 1960s the monetary authorities accepted Coombs’s analysis and 
began to allow greater flexibility in the setting of interest rates, thereby making it possible 
to rely more heavily than in the past on open market operations. It is possible to trace this 
development through the speeches of J.G. Phillips, Deputy Governor of the RBA from 
1959 to 1968 and Coombs’s successor as Governor. In an address to the Australian 
Society of Accountants (NSW Division) in June 1960, Phillips said that so far as the 
control of bank credit was concerned, the ‘major instrument here, in a quantitative sense, 
is probably the Statutory Reserve Deposit Accounts, the former Special Accounts…This 
is probably the major instrument in the hands of the Reserve Bank at present for 
controlling and influencing the liquidity of the banks.’ (Phillips n/d: 10) By October 
1964, in his ES&A Bank Lecture at the University of Queensland, Phillips claimed that 
‘The evolution of monetary policy in recent years in Australia has been towards greater 
emphasis on the liquidity situation generally, rather than more narrowly on the banks. 
This has involved greater concern by the monetary authorities with the prices and yields 
of the wide range of securities now offered to the public, a greater concern with interest 
rate movements and a readiness to use them more freely as an instrument of policy.’ 
(Phillips n/d: 31) In an interview with The Banker, published in December 1969, Phillips 
explained that as ‘a rough rule, and depending on circumstances, we would nowadays 
tend to look first at the more pervasive instruments of open market operations and interest 
rates, and then at the direct influence on lending, and direct liquidity controls.’ (Phillips 
1969: 1289) In his R.C. Mills Memorial Lecture delivered in 1971, Phillips spoke about 
the 
 
 increasing emphasis we [at the RBA] have been placing on market-oriented 
policies as against direct controls [which] has come about because of the need to 
take into account the increasing flexibility and diversity of the Australian 
financial system, and its growing relationships with the world outside Australia. 
In these circumstances direct controls have tended to lose their strength, because 
market forces produce reactions which in time largely offset direct control. 
Direct restrictions on bank lending tend to promote a shift of lending to other 
financial intermediaries, which is strengthened if bank deposit rates are not 
competitive with those of other borrowers…Shifts of this kind induced by direct 
controls do not necessarily promote the efficiency of the financial system, where 
the optimum position from an economic point of view is an institutional 
structure determined by the relative efficiency of the various intermediaries in 
providing financial services. (Phillips n/d: 71) 
   24
On the issue of inflation, the RBA, in its Annual Report for 1970/71, noted that ‘In the 
period since the Second World War most countries have come to regard gradually rising 
prices as an inevitable accompaniment to the successful pursuit of policies of high 
employment and economic growth.’ (Reserve Bank 1971: 36) It went on: ‘Recently, 
however, without any apparent change in aims regarding either employment levels or 
economic growth, the rate of inflation has tended to quicken significantly in many of the 
developed countries of the world.’ The United States was mentioned as an example: it 
‘experienced a prolonged period of excess demand prior to 1969. During this period not 
only did inflation accelerate but the community appears to have come increasingly to 
expect that prices would go on rising and to have acted accordingly. This inflationary 
psychology has been manifest, even after the elimination of excess demand…It seems 
that once the view that prices are going to continue rising strongly becomes entrenched, 
fairly drastic measures may be required to modify this expectation.’ Twelve years earlier, 
the then Governor of Australia’s central bank was warning of this very problem and the 




Garvan, Theodore, Gibson, Melville, Chifley and Coombs all made significant 
contributions to Australian monetary and banking history. Some of them were more 
effective than others, but all of them left their mark. The immediate results of Garvan’s 
influence on the policies of the Australian Notes Board and the Commonwealth Bank 
were condemned by business groups and by politicians. He may have held a narrow 
conception of the relationship between the quantity of money and the price level, but 
given the government’s intention to return to the gold standard at the prewar parity, the 
policy of systematic contraction of the monetary base in order to influence the price level 
and, ultimately, the value of the ₤A, was successful in preparing the way for Australia’s 
return to gold. This policy led to the 1924 Commonwealth Bank Act, the aim of which 
was to enhance the central banking powers of the Bank. The legislation had two enduring 
consequences. First, it established a board of directors drawn from industry; its structure 
and composition, in fact, were almost identical to the RBA’s board when it was 
established in 1959. And second, the 1924 Act forced the banks to open settlement 
accounts at the Commonwealth Bank. These accounts now lie at the heart of the present 
cash rate system, the main mechanism for monetary control by the RBA.  
 
Theodore, in promoting a separate central bank without commercial functions, was 
attempting at once to deal with criticisms that had been levelled in the late 1920s at the 
composite nature of the Commonwealth Bank and the political problems that the Scullin 
government faced when trying to fund recovery measures. In 1959 the RBA was 
established as a separate central bank, as Theodore had intended with the CRB. Gibson, 
on the other hand, set himself to constrain what he considered to be the financially 
reckless tendencies of politicians, especially Labor politicians. Adherence to the gold 
standard, balanced budgets and a central bank run by persons drawn from the world of 
business were principles to which he subscribed, and he sought to apply these principles 
during the late 1920s-early 1930s. On balance they probably delayed recovery though it 
is arguable that, without Gibson, greater instability might have prolonged the recovery   25
process. Whatever Gibson’s personal views, the RBA since 1996 has been able to adopt 
monetary policies free from government interference, as Gibson himself strived to 
achieve during his time at the central bank. 
 
Melville, for his part, brought economic intelligence to the central bank, creating as he 
did a research mentality that became highly respected throughout the nation and beyond. 
His lucid explanation at the Royal Commission of how monetary policy should be 
conducted foreshadowed the Bretton Woods system that Australia followed in the 1950s 
and 1960s. His leadership of the Australian delegation to the Bretton Woods conference, 
and his advice to the government that Australia should join the IMF and World Bank, 
were equally important for the conduct of economic policy in the immediate post-Second 
World War decades. Melville defined and promoted a new monetary framework for 
Australia, but his enduring legacy was to establish a professional approach to central 
banking in Australia. Coombs thought that Melville had ‘made a contribution to central 
banking that is without equal in the world’ (Macfarlane 2002: 15); Macfarlane wrote that 
‘in the 1930s and 1940s you could be forgiven for thinking that Melville was the central 
bank’. (Macfarlane 2002: 16)  
 
Chifley, more than any other individual, created the regulatory system of the immediate 
postwar years, obsessed as he was with the experience of the depression in the 1930s and 
the policy deficiencies of that time. Coombs, on the other hand, quickly observed the 
deficiencies of the regulatory system and argued for the adoption of market processes. He 
tried to warn Australians as early as the 1950s of the dangers of becoming complacent 
about inflation, identifying as he did the phenomena of stagflation and inflationary 
expectations and their implications for policy, about a decade before they were 
highlighted by economists and central bankers in other countries.  
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